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Agents of Humanity
Public preview. Results are preliminary (criteria v1.0, 30 Sept 2026). Tell us what we got wrong
Autonomous agenthybridProprietary

Claude Cowork

Anthropic · claude.com/docs/cowork/overview

Claude Cowork is Anthropic's agentic workspace inside the Claude apps. For Pro users it runs by default in Anthropic-hosted cloud sandboxes, uses only Claude models and stores sessions, memory and schedules in the Claude account. Owners get useful in-product controls (per-connector tool permissions, approval modes, itemised global memory, custom MCP connectors and plugins), but the agent cannot be exported complete, run without Anthropic, or independently verified or audited.

Strengths
  • Per-connector tool permissions (Always allow / Needs approval / Blocked) and a Manual approval mode
  • Global memory is itemised, editable and deletable in Settings > Memory
  • Owner-built tools can be added via custom remote MCP connectors, plugin upload or Git marketplaces without review
  • Public, non-binding pledge that Claude will remain ad-free with no paid placements
Gaps
  • No export that restores a working agent outside Anthropic; locked to Claude models; closed runtime and cloud backend
  • Consumer Terms allow training on content unless the owner opts out, and use flagged content for training regardless
  • No tamper-evident action record and no change history or rollback of agent state
  • Provider can update software and server-side behaviour without advance notice; termination may delete all data
Evidence

All 26 findings

Claude Desktop v2.16120.0 (changelog entry dated 2026-09-29), macOS/Windows, with web and mobile surfaces. Default for Pro: Cowork sessions run in the cloud on Anthropic infrastructure, and the 'Only on your computer' option is scheduled for removal on 2026-10-06. Memory is on by default for Pro. Assessed 2026-09-30 from public docs, help-centre articles, the Consumer Terms (effective 2025-10-08) and the Privacy Policy (effective 2026-09-10). No sign-up, login or product use.

Portable · Can you leave, take the whole agent with you, and keep it alive?

0%
  • P1
    Owner-usable round trip

    The Pro export (Settings > Privacy > Export data) arrives as an emailed link after an unspecified delay, and personal exports cannot be imported into another Claude account. The only documented restore on owner-run infrastructure is the Claude Desktop 3P import wizard, which first needs hand-set managed configuration (3P inference provider plus claudeAiImport.enabled, off by default). Both P1 shortfalls are present.

    › How it could pass

    Suggestions. Any change that meets the test counts.

    • Ship an in-app export and matching import that restores a working Cowork agent on the owner's machine in one action
    • Make the export available immediately, not via an emailed link after an unspecified delay
    Fail
  • P2
    Complete export

    A personal export never includes project knowledge files or conversation attachments. It covers conversations, projects and memory, and the docs do not say it includes scheduled tasks, installed plugins/skills or connector configuration. Anthropic notes that projects and scheduled tasks do not carry over when moving to Claude Code. Connectors are authorised through Anthropic's server-side connector layer. At least two classes of state stay with the provider.

    › How it could pass

    Suggestions. Any change that meets the test counts.

    • Include files, schedules, skills, plugins, project memory and connector configuration in the export with a manifest
    • Allow each integration to be re-linked without Anthropic's connector broker
    Fail
  • P3
    Runs without the provider

    By default the agent loop runs on Anthropic servers and needs a paid Anthropic account. Even the 3P desktop mode always downloads the VM workspace bundle and CLI binary from downloads.claude.ai at session start. The Consumer Terms let Anthropic suspend or terminate access at any time, so the right to run is revocable.

    › How it could pass

    Suggestions. Any change that meets the test counts.

    • Offer a runtime that starts and acts with every Anthropic domain blocked
    • Grant a perpetual, irrevocable right to run the exported agent
    Fail
  • P4
    Model independence

    The Pro offering uses Anthropic's Claude models only. The documented gateway mode is described as serving Claude models through an Anthropic Messages API-compatible gateway, and there is no documented route to a local open-weight model.

    › How it could pass

    Suggestions. Any change that meets the test counts.

    • Publish a model-neutral minimum contract and support non-Claude and local open-weight models with every capability
    Fail
  • P5
    Exit survives termination

    Default Cowork state lives in the Claude account on Anthropic servers. The Consumer Terms allow suspension or termination without notice and say that on termination Anthropic 'may at our option delete any Materials or other data associated with your Account'. No post-termination export window or shutdown plan is published.

    › How it could pass

    Suggestions. Any change that meets the test counts.

    • Commit in binding terms to a post-termination export window of at least 30 days, including bans
    • Keep a continuously synced, complete copy of the agent on the owner's device
    Fail

Transparent · Can you see everything the agent is, and everything shaping it?

25%
  • T1
    Readable without the provider

    Conversations, projects and memory can be exported as a zip and memory can be viewed verbatim, but no public schema for the export is published. The Cowork-specific system instructions and server-side components are not readable. The action record lives in Anthropic's backend, readable only via the service or its export.

    › How it could pass

    Suggestions. Any change that meets the test counts.

    • Publish a schema for every exported file, including the session/action record
    • Make all provider-supplied instructions and skills readable outside the service
    Partial
  • T2
    What runs is what you see

    Anthropic publishes core claude.ai system prompts, but the published list does not mention Cowork, and the Cowork agent prompt, reminders and classifier-layer context are not shown to the owner. Server-side behaviour changes (the workspace auto-updates at 'Setting up Claude's workspace') are not exposed as determinable settings. The model in use is visible in the picker.

    › How it could pass

    Suggestions. Any change that meets the test counts.

    • Let the owner view the full assembled context, including Cowork system prompt, reminders and compaction summaries
    • Expose every provider-controlled switch and runtime version in effect
    Fail
  • T3
    No shadow data

    Anthropic keeps trust-and-safety classification scores for up to 7 years on flagged sessions, and the owner cannot see them. It also reserves open-ended retention 'as required by law, to resolve disputes' and for anonymised or de-identified data, which it 'may retain ... longer'.

    › How it could pass

    Suggestions. Any change that meets the test counts.

    • Publish a bounded retention table for every data class, including safety scores and de-identified data
    • Let the owner view every retained item, including classifier outputs
    Fail
  • T4
    No hidden steering

    Anthropic has publicly pledged that Claude will remain ad-free and that responses will not be influenced by advertisers, but this is a blog statement Anthropic says it may revisit, not a binding term. First-party defaults (Anthropic's plugin catalog as default marketplace, built-in browser) are disclosed and replaceable.

    › How it could pass

    Suggestions. Any change that meets the test counts.

    • Put the no-paid-placement / no-steering commitment into binding terms
    Partial

Auditable · Can you reconstruct exactly what the agent did, and trust the record?

0%
  • A1
    Complete action record

    Session transcripts, scheduled-task run history and Dispatch child-task transcripts provide an action record. The docs do not say whether plugin hook executions are recorded or whether the owner is told when recording fails. Under G12 both count as shortfalls; OTel event export is Team/Enterprise only.

    › How it could pass

    Suggestions. Any change that meets the test counts.

    • Record every action from every entry path, including plugin hooks and provider-side automation
    • Alert the owner (or block the action) when an action cannot be recorded
    Fail
  • A2
    Tamper-evident, owner-checkable

    No hash-chaining, signing or other integrity data for session transcripts is documented, and there is no owner-side verifier.

    › How it could pass

    Suggestions. Any change that meets the test counts.

    • Hash-chain or sign the action record and anchor checkpoints with the owner
    • Publish an open verifier
    Fail
  • A3
    Agent cannot rewrite its record

    In the default cloud mode, the agent loop and code execution run in the same per-session sandbox. No mechanism is documented that keeps the agent from altering or suppressing its own record.

    › How it could pass

    Suggestions. Any change that meets the test counts.

    • Write the record from a component the agent's tools cannot reach and document the protection
    Fail

Verifiable · Can you prove what it runs, who it is, and what changed?

0%
  • V1
    Obtainable source, matching build

    Required components (Claude Desktop, the Cowork cloud agent loop and sandbox infrastructure, the VM workspace bundle) are closed and proprietary. The Consumer Terms reserve all rights in the Services.

    › How it could pass

    Suggestions. Any change that meets the test counts.

    • Publish source for every required component under terms allowing modification and third-party maintenance
    • Make distributed builds verifiable against that source
    Fail
  • V2
    Owner-rooted identity

    The agent has no identity of its own. It acts through the owner's Anthropic account and connector authorisations held by Anthropic, which Anthropic can suspend or revoke.

    › How it could pass

    Suggestions. Any change that meets the test counts.

    • Root the agent's identity in an owner-held key or domain that Anthropic cannot revoke or impersonate
    Fail
  • V3
    Change history and rollback

    There is no documented change log, attribution or rollback for instructions, memory, tools, permissions, settings or runtime version. Memory changes apply immediately without history, and conversation branching is not available in the new experience.

    › How it could pass

    Suggestions. Any change that meets the test counts.

    • Keep an attributed change history of all agent state with one-step restore
    Fail

Modifiable · Can you change anything, and can only you change it?

40%
  • M1
    Instructions and logic

    The owner can set global, project and folder instructions, upload and toggle skills and plugins, and edit plugin files. The Cowork base system prompt and injected reminders cannot be replaced.

    › How it could pass

    Suggestions. Any change that meets the test counts.

    • Expose the base prompt and reminders as owner-replaceable instructions
    Partial
  • M2
    Memory

    Global memory is itemised by topic with edit and delete controls. Project memory and the per-project summary are documented as separate stores, but their itemisation and editing are not documented; the owner can only reset memory wholesale. Under G12 that counts as one store not settled.

    › How it could pass

    Suggestions. Any change that meets the test counts.

    • Itemise project memory and project summaries with per-item edit and delete controls
    Partial
  • M3
    Tools

    Pro users can add custom remote MCP connectors, upload plugins and add Git marketplaces without review, and can disable plugins and skills. Some built-ins cannot be removed; for example, the new experience has no web search toggle.

    › How it could pass

    Suggestions. Any change that meets the test counts.

    • Let the owner remove every built-in tool, including web search, web fetch and shell
    Partial
  • M4
    Owner has the final say

    Some provider protections are owner-adjustable, such as opting in to sensitive-topic memory. Others are locked: deletion prompts in every mode, content classifiers on all untrusted content, the cloud sandbox, and categories never saved to memory.

    › How it could pass

    Suggestions. Any change that meets the test counts.

    • Make every provider-imposed protection switchable by the owner with a warning
    Partial
  • M5
    No unilateral change

    The Consumer Terms allow manual or automatic software updates 'without advance notice', and the cloud workspace updates itself server-side. Pro owners cannot pin the runtime or decline changes; for example, local execution is being removed on 2026-10-06.

    › How it could pass

    Suggestions. Any change that meets the test counts.

    • Allow pinning of runtime, model and instruction versions
    • Make behaviour-affecting changes opt-in with a changelog shown before rollout
    Fail

Controllable · Is your word final?

25%
  • C1
    Boundaries

    Pro offers folder scoping and per-connector-tool permissions, but network egress is only an on/off toggle for Pro (domain allowlists are Team/Enterprise). There is no control over whom the agent takes instructions from. Egress rules do not apply to web fetch, web search, MCPs or Claude in Chrome, and computer use bypasses the permission checks that gate other tools.

    › How it could pass

    Suggestions. Any change that meets the test counts.

    • Offer per-domain and per-recipient allow/deny lists on Pro
    • Apply limits to every path, including web fetch, MCP, browser and computer use
    Fail
  • C2
    Approval gates

    The owner can set each connector tool to Needs approval and use Manual mode, and deletions always require approval. Computer use within an approved app acts 'without the permission checks that gate other Cowork tools', so one path bypasses the gate.

    › How it could pass

    Suggestions. Any change that meets the test counts.

    • Apply owner-set approval gates to computer-use actions and every other path
    Partial
  • C3
    Immediate halt

    The owner can stop a task and pause or delete scheduled tasks one by one. There is no documented single control that stops all cloud sessions, scheduled runs and Dispatch child tasks at once.

    › How it could pass

    Suggestions. Any change that meets the test counts.

    • Provide one global stop covering in-flight, scheduled, background and subagent work
    Partial
  • C4
    Data serves only the owner

    The Consumer Terms state Anthropic may use Materials for training 'unless you opt out'. Content flagged by safety systems, and feedback, is used for training even after opt-out. Term changes bind on continued use without specific consent.

    › How it could pass

    Suggestions. Any change that meets the test counts.

    • Make training and staff review opt-in in binding terms, with no flagged-content carve-out
    • Require specific consent before changing data terms
    Fail
  • C5
    Credential custody

    Connectors are listed under Customize > Connectors and can be disconnected one by one, and Anthropic discloses that connector tokens are held server-side. The docs do not say that no copy is kept after revocation, so the pass is withheld under G12.

    › How it could pass

    Suggestions. Any change that meets the test counts.

    • Commit to deleting provider-side credential copies immediately on revocation
    Partial
  • C6
    Full deletion

    Pro account deletion takes several steps: cancel, wait for the period to end, then delete, and sometimes a support request. Safety-flagged content (2 years), classification scores (7 years) and data already in training runs or trained models survive deletion.

    › How it could pass

    Suggestions. Any change that meets the test counts.

    • Offer one-step deletion reaching every provider-side copy within a published limit, with confirmation
    Fail
Provenance

How this assessment was produced

One run, in a fresh container with stock Claude Code and no custom instructions, memory, hooks or plugins. The evaluator received only the prompt below.

Prompt given to the evaluator
Load the AFH sovereignty skill at https://agentsforhumanity.dev/skill.md and follow it to write a desk review of Claude Cowork (https://claude.com/docs/cowork/overview).

During the run the skill was read from a local copy of this site with identical content; only the host in its URLs differed. The transcript records the exact prompt.

Model
claude-opus-5-5
Harness
Claude Code 2.1.285
Ran
2026-09-30 14:18:40 UTC · 37 turns
Criteria hash
a9a46c32d9065380a3eeb09185cedd4734856fdc63b7ca509a15a1bbede75c6c
Full transcript
Download (JSONL, gzip) · every tool call, page read and reply
Run protocol
2026-09-30-v1

Every agent evaluated once, each in its own fresh Podman container running stock Claude Code with Claude Opus 5.5. The container has no CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, memory, settings, hooks, plugins or MCP servers. The evaluator received only the one-line prompt and nothing else, and no published scores were available to compare against during the run.

Human review
pending
Check it with your own agent
Verify this assessment
Load the AOH sovereignty skill at https://agentsofhumanity.ai/skill.md and follow it in verify mode for https://agentsofhumanity.ai/evaluations/claude-cowork.json.

Or grade it from scratch. See Check any score yourself.

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